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1. Introduction 
In an integrated world with large international trade and capital flows, a country with an 
internationalised currency can enjoy many advantages. As currency internationalisation 
progresses, the foreign exchange risks and costs of foreign currency financing associated 
with foreign transactions are expected to decrease. Another important advantage of currency 
internationalisation is that it gets a country further away from “original sin”, that is, by allowing 
residents to borrow externally in local currency, it prevents the likelihood of a financial crisis 
caused by a sudden stop of foreign capital flows. As a result of capital account liberalisation 
in emerging market economies over the last 20 years or so, the integration of domestic and 
foreign financial markets has substantially deepened, increasing the incidence and severity 
of economic volatility arising from external shocks. The recent severe stress in the domestic 
financial markets of major currencies has led to a sharp withdrawal of foreign currency 
financing in emerging markets and heavy pressure on exchange rates and asset prices in 
them. Korea has been one of the emerging markets most affected, primarily due to its heavy 
reliance on external transactions. Recent episodes suggest that pursuing currency 
internationalisation may, therefore, be a strong instrument to cushion the adverse effects of 
external financial shocks and should be considered as one of the important policy issues in 
small open economies such as Korea. 
However, currency internationalisation cannot be carried out without costs: the 
internationalisation of the local currency will adversely affect monetary and credit policy, as 
monetary policy independence can be significantly restricted. Furthermore, countries in the 
early stages of capital liberalisation and currency internationalisation tend to be more 
vulnerable to external financial shocks. Once the internationalisation of the currency has 
reached a mature stage, there is a reduction in the risk of exposure to speculative attacks by 
foreign capital. This implies that emerging market countries that lie somewhere on the scale 
between developed and undeveloped face the greatest likelihood of experiencing a foreign 
exchange crisis. Thus, it is important for developing countries to find a possible strategy for 
pursuing currency internationalisation that maximises the advantages while minimising the 
risks. 
The Korean economy has become one of the world’s largest, with a huge volume of trade 
and capital flows. Korean financial markets are developing fast: the Korean banking market 
is the third largest in Asia, and its equity market and bond markets are among the largest. 
However, won-denominated transactions are relatively small given the scale of the economy 
and its high degree of openness, and the won is scarcely used outside Korea. As a result, 
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disorderly exchange rate fluctuations and the currency mismatch problem persist, potentially 
posing the risk of bringing a high degree of volatility to the economy. 
The sections below suggest the prerequisite conditions for the attainment of currency 
internationalisation in Korea, and delineate the distinctive features of currency 
internationalisation – including the benefits and costs – by extending the explanation to cover 
the Korean economy. Section 2 explains the progress of Korean won internationalisation 
from three aspects: the institutional conditions; the economic conditions; and the actual use 
of the won as an international currency. Section 3 analyses the benefits and costs of 
currency internationalisation using the recent experiences of Korea, while Section 4 explains 
the necessity of strengthening financial cooperation in Asia as a regional safety net in order 
to absorb the shocks from the global financial crisis. Section 5 closes the paper by 
attempting to set out some conclusions. 
2. Progress of Korean won internationalisation 
Progress in a country’s currency internationalisation can be described in terms of given 
conditions and the currency’s actual uses. The given conditions may be defined as 
institutional and economic conditions, while its actual uses are determined by its usage in 
trade invoicing, financial transaction denomination and other official use. Although 
institutional support and the economic performance of a country do not inevitably lead to the 
internationalisation of its currency, they are key requirements that are needed for the 
currency to become increasingly used internationally. 
 
Box 1 
Determinants of currency Internationalisation 
 
 
Institutional liberalisation 
In order for a currency to be used beyond the borders of the issuing country, there should be 
no institutional restrictions on foreign exchange trading. Financing – in particular, bond 
issuance or the extension of loans – should be allowed without any constraints and 
supported by an appropriate payment system. For instance, if a bank abroad wants to make 
transactions related to its Korean won position, it has to participate in an established 
“interbank payment system” that allows Korean won-denominated borrowing and lending 
without any restrictions.  
It has been a while since Korea first allowed basic transactions, including the exchange of 
won abroad and the bringing-in and taking-out of won, in addition to won-denominated 
current transactions. However, the settlement of capital account transactions in won requires 
permission except for a few transaction types. “Free won accounts” are created exclusively 
for won-denominated securities investment and current account transactions by non-
residents.  
 
International 
demand 
Currency 
internationalisation 
Institutional 
support 
Economic 
conditions 
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Table 1 
Institutional reforms on the internationalisation of the won 
Definition Degree of liberalisation 
Unit of account Won-denominated current transactions: liberalised (1988~91) Won-denominated capital transactions: liberalised (1992) 
Medium of 
exchange 
Current account transactions: liberalised via “free won account” (1996) 
Capital account transactions: partially allowed1 
Store of value 
Deposits: liberalised via “free won account” (1999~2001) 
Borrowing: allowed up to KRW 30 billion (2001~07) 
Issuance of won-denominated securities by non-residents: allowed (2001~06) 
1  Payment and settlement in respect of investments in domestic securities and forwards via “non-resident won 
account for investment use only”; settlement of the domestic transaction in overseas trade office. 
 
All won-denominated funds may be deposited in free won accounts, including foreign 
currency funds remitted from abroad or brought in by non-residents and exchanged for 
Korean won, as well as domestic means of payment acquired by non-residents from 
residents as the proceeds of current transactions. Non-residents may transfer funds to pay 
for won-denominated transactions with residents. However, transferring funds to pay for won-
denominated transactions between non-residents is prohibited. Won fund-raising by non-
residents is subject to regulation, although the ceiling on won-denominated loans to non-
residents has been raised, and the threshold amount triggering the need for prior reporting to 
the BoK has been adjusted upwards to KRW 30 billion.  
Non-residents are able to issue won-denominated securities (“Arirang” bonds) upon 
notification to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. Residents and non-residents are able to 
issue won-denominated financial market instruments outside Korea (eurowon). However, 
payment for eurowon bonds should, in principle, be made in foreign currency, and payment 
for them in won requires prior notification to the BoK. 
Economic conditions 
The currency of a country with a large share in international output, trade and finance has a 
natural advantage in becoming an international currency. This is because the larger the 
country’s share of world exports, the greater the chance of its currency being used to invoice 
and settle international trade transactions (Grassman (1976)). 
With respect to the real economy, Korea has emerged as a powerful country in the world 
economy, ranking 13th and 11th in terms of world GDP and trade volume, respectively (as of 
2007). It has also become closely integrated with international markets, with respective ratios 
of about 75% and 18% of trade volume and capital flows to GDP. Korea’s economic scale is 
relatively small compared with neighbouring Japan and China, but it is larger than other 
Asian economies. Furthermore, as a result of liberalisation measures taken since the early 
1990s, Korea’s financial markets are highly open and mature, which is exceptional among 
newly emerging economies. With regard to the size of the financial markets, Korea has larger 
stock and bond markets (in relation to GDP) than most of the BRIC group of countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China). Foreign investment accounts for more than 25% of the 
Korean stock market, a significantly larger proportion than any of the BRIC economies. In 
addition, among the emerging economies of the G20 countries, Korea is the only nation 
whose stock market has been included in the FTSE Developed Market Index.  
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Table 2 
Relative size of the economy and financial markets compared with US 
 GDP 
Bank 
credit/
GDP 
Non-bank 
credit/GDP 
Stock 
capitalisation/
GDP 
Bond 
capitalisation/
GDP 
Trade/ 
GDP (%) 
Capital 
flows/ 
GDP (%) 
US 100 100 100 100 100 23 24 
UK 18 336 68 93 28 39 155 
Japan 33 225 46 55 116 29 16 
France 17 200 41 61 64 45 54 
Germany 22 257 52 32 51 74 42 
Netherlands 5 364 74 73 71 115 86 
Switzerland 3 357 72 165 43 93 167 
Korea 7 202 58 42 48 75 18 
China 20 N.A. N.A. 30 19 65 13 
Singapore 1 230 57 113 37 345 116 
HK 1 334 68 368 18 344 256 
Indonesia 3 48 10 19 15 47 7 
Malaysia 1 216 56 116 57 175 30 
Philippines 1 66 15 23 18 74 13 
Thailand 2 168 44 55 25 112 12 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; World Bank Financial Development Indicators. 
 
International use of the Korean won 
Although the volume of transactions in the foreign exchange market in Korea has increased 
remarkably, international use of the Korean won remains insignificant. In Korea, around 80% 
of imports and exports are US dollar-denominated, and the Korean won is rarely used as an 
invoice currency for exports and imports.  
Won-denominated international bond issues and the cross-border liabilities of banks have 
also made very slow progress. The market for Arirang bonds (won-denominated bonds 
issued by foreign entities in Korea) is extremely small, constituting less than 0.1% of 
corporate bond issuance in Korea. The won eurobond market, trading a won-denominated 
bond issued by residents overseas, is also negligible, with a record of only three issues since 
1999. 
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Table 3 
Currency distribution of foreign exchange market turnover 
Daily average in April, in billions of US dollars 
Traditional foreign exchange market OTC derivatives1  
Total Domestic Offshore Spot Forwards Swaps Total 
US 2,660 548 2,112 790 289 1,580 2,055 
Euro area 1,139 264 875 420 137 582 811 
Japan 510 170 340 206 61 242 367 
UK 461 297 164 150 46 265 344 
Switzerland 209 69 140 88 21 100 139 
China 15 9 6 9 5 1 6 
Hong Kong 86 73 12 16 6 64 74 
Indonesia 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 
Korea 34 27 7 15 10 9 23 
Philippines 4 2 1 1 1 1 2 
Singapore 38   8 3 26 30 
Australia 205   53 20 132 167 
1  Currency options + currency swaps. 
Source: BIS (2007). 
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Table 4 
Settlement currencies used for Korea’s current trade 
In billions of US dollars and per cent 
  1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007 
US dollar 228.4 (84.9) 
277.5 
(82.7) 
281.8 
(83.8) 
417.1 
(82.0) 
552.1 
(78.1) 
639.9 
(83.3) 
Yen 21.5 (8.0) 
29.1 
(8.7) 
28.5 
(8.5) 
46.9 
(9.2) 
48.5 
(6.9) 
53.8 
(7.0) 
Euro  6.3 (1.9) 
19.0 
(5.6) 
34.5 
(6.8) 
46.4 
(7.0) 
59.9 
(7.8) 
Trade 
(A) 
Won   0.3 (0.1) 
0.6 
(0.1) 
1.6 
(0.2) 
1.9 
(0.2) 
US dollar 55.6 (78.5) 
73.0 
(80.6) 
74.4 
(78.4) 
108.1 
(79.7) 
137.8 
(79.1) 
173.5 
(81.6) 
Yen 8.6 (12.1) 
9.4 
(10.3) 
7.6 
(8.1) 
9.7 
(7.2) 
9.8 
(5.6) 
11.4 
(5.4) 
Euro  0.8 (0.9) 
4.7 
(5.0) 
7.3 
(5.4) 
12.7 
(7.3) 
16.3 
(7.7) 
Service, 
income 
 and 
current 
transfers 
 (B) 
Won   0.3 (0.3) 
0.6 
(0.4) 
1.3 
(0.7) 
2.0 
(0.9) 
US dollar 284.0 (83.5) 
350.5 
(82.3) 
356.1 
(82.6) 
525.2 
(81.5) 
689.9 
(82.8) 
813.4 
(82.9) 
Yen 30.1 (8.9) 
38.5 
(9.0) 
36.2 
(8.4) 
56.7 
(8.8) 
58.3 
(7.0) 
65.2 
(6.6) 
Euro  7.1 (1.7) 
23.7 
(5.5) 
41.8 
(6.5) 
59.1 
(7.1) 
76.2 
(7.8) 
(A)+(B) 
Won   0.5 (0.1) 
1.2 
(0.2) 
2.9 
(0.3) 
3.9 
(0.4) 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
3. The benefits and costs of currency internationalisation 
3.1 The benefits of having an international currency 
Currency internationalisation offers various benefits, including saving the cost of hedging the 
foreign exchange risk inherent in external transactions and financial intermediation and, 
especially for small-scale open economies, lowering the amount of foreign exchange 
reserves needed to act as a buffer against external financial shocks. 
The section below summarises the difficulties faced by countries that have been unable to 
internationalise their currencies, Korea in particular, at a time of global financial turbulence, 
and spells out why currency internationalisation is essential to a small open economy such 
as Korea. 
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Eliminating the exchange rate risk in external transactions 
If the domestic currency can be used for invoicing and payment instruments, the country’s 
exporters, importers, borrowers and lenders can eliminate the exchange rate risk inherent in 
international trading and financial transactions. However, in Korea, the won is rarely used as 
an invoice currency for exports and imports.  
Because the invoice currency is usually a foreign currency, exporters need to hedge future 
export revenues.4  The strengthening of the Korean won against the US dollar as from 2003 
generated expectations of the won’s further appreciation in the Korean foreign exchange 
market; such expectations were further built up by extensive sales of two types of forward 
exchange contract since 2007. During 2007, sales of forward exchange contracts by 
shipbuilders expanded greatly, influenced by brisk receipts of shipbuilding orders. At the 
same time, an increase in residents’ foreign securities investment, due to the government’s 
policy of encouraging overseas investment, and an increase in sales of overseas funds also 
led to increased sales of forward exchange contracts. 
The increase in sales of such contracts, however, brought an unexpected result – an rise in 
short-term external debt. From the second half of 2007, the increased selling of forward 
exchange contracts by shipbuilders and investors with overseas assets drove up short-term 
external debt, because it increased foreign currency borrowing by banks seeking to adjust 
their foreign currency position. 
This phenomenon can be explained as a “fallacy of composition” problem. Hedging actions 
that may seem perfectly rational from the standpoint of an individual firm could, in aggregate, 
have brought the negative externalities to the whole economy, including large imbalances in 
forward exchange markets and an accumulation of external debt. 
Graph 1 
Firms’ selling of forward exchange contracts and total external debt 
0
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Banks' short-term debt
Firms' selling of forward exchange contracts
(bil.USD)
 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
                                                
4  Because importers find it comparatively easy to pass through the fluctuations in the exchange rate into 
changes in import prices, the hedging ratio for import transactions is relatively low compared with that for 
export transactions. 
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Table 5 
Volume of KIKO trading by exporters 
As of end-August 2008, in billions of won 
 Number of companies 
Balance 
(USD bn) 
Realised 
loss (a) 
Valuation 
loss (b) 
Total loss 
(a+b) 
Small & medium- 
sized companies 
47.1 5.9 506.2 778.4 1,284.6 
Large companies 4.6 2.0 137.2 272.5 409.7 
Total 51.7 7.9 643.4 1,050.9 1,694.3 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service. 
 
As an another example, the volume of currency option trading between Korean banks and 
exporting companies for the purpose of hedging foreign exchange rate risk, including KIKO 
(“knock-in/knock-out”) trading, has grown considerably since 2006. However, with the sharp 
rise in the exchange rate in 2008/9, some small and medium-sized companies that took out 
KIKO contracts have faced large losses.  
If foreign transactions are not hedged, or if there are big forecast errors in the future 
exchange rate, temporary fluctuations in currency values result in significant fluctuations in 
corporate and financial institution earnings. Under the current accounting rules relating to 
foreign exchange translations, external transactions must be recorded on the balance sheet 
as of the date of transaction or the B/S recording. However, during a financial panic, such as 
the one we are currently experiencing, an abnormal amount of exchange differences that do 
not accurately reflect economic fundamentals frequently occur. Even when hedge accounting 
is used and exchange differences do not directly affect the net income, the loss is recorded 
in comprehensive income, thus affecting the overall financial ratios, such as the current ratio 
and debt ratio, causing a company’s financials to appear more at risk than they actually are. 
For example, in the case of an airline company, exchange differences may be so severe as 
to outweigh the operating income, resulting in a phenomenon called “wagging the dog”. 
Through this balance sheet effect channel, foreign exchange fluctuations can be the key 
factor in heightening the degree of economic volatility. 
Graph 2 
Fluctuation in income of an airline company in Korea 
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Accessing international financial markets without exchange rate risk 
If foreign investors are willing to invest in the country’s domestic currency debt, domestic 
firms and financial institutions can access international financial markets without incurring 
exchange rate risk. However, in Korea, won-denominated international bond issues or the 
cross-border liabilities of banks have made very slow progress. The volume of won 
eurobonds (a won-denominated bond issued by residents overseas) is also negligible.  
On the other hand, foreigners’ investment in won-denominated assets rapidly increased after 
the opening of the capital market. Recently, a dramatic increase was registered in foreigners’ 
net buying of Korean bonds, as a result of active arbitrage trading. While this phenomenon 
has had long-term positive effects on the market, by expanding the breadth and depth of the 
domestic bond market, it has also had negative effects, such as causing increased interest 
rate volatility in response to changes in foreign investors’ investment patterns. 
Graph 3 
Amounts and proportion of market capitalisation held by foreigners 
Stock purchase and holding ratio                  Bond purchase and holding ratio) 
  
Source: Bank of Korea. 
As foreign investors are de facto restricted from accessing the domestic won funding market, 
they are increasingly participating in the offshore non-deliverable forward (NDF) market. 
According to Debelle et al (2006), the daily trading volume of NDFs for the Korean won is the 
largest among Asian countries, even though an NDF market for the Malaysian ringgit has 
developed in recent years. While foreign investors participate only in the NDF market, the 
hedging activity of foreign exchange banks has an effect on both the onshore and offshore 
foreign exchange markets. For example, the won/dollar exchange rate, which maintained a 
generally downward movement for most of 2007, trended upwards from mid-November that 
year, owing to the increase in non-residents’ net purchases of NDFs. 
 
Table 6 
Volume of spot and NDF transactions 
Daily averages, in billions of US dollars 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Spot1 2.6 3.9 4.5 6.3 8.3 7.8 
NDF 1.3 1.7 2.6 4.2 6.2 9.4 
1  Only transactions through brokers. 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
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Table 7 
International investment position of Korea 
In billions of US dollars 
 Liabilities Assets 
 
As of 
end-
2008p 
Changes Trade factors1 
Non- 
trade 
factors2 
As of 
end-
2008p 
Changes Trade factors1 
Non- 
trade 
factors2 
Total 601.3 –225.0 –102.6 –122.4 491.5 –105.3 –108.2 2.9 
Direct investment 85.3 –36.7 2.2 –38.9 95.5 20.8 12.8 8.0 
Portfolio 
investment 251.7 –204.9 –38.5 –166.5 75.4 –83.2 –23.1 –60.1 
(Equity securities) 124.7 –195.4 –41.2 –154.2 47.9 –57.0 –6.4 –50.6 
(Debt securities) 127.1 –9.5 2.8 –12.3 27.5 –26.2 –16.7 –9.5 
Financial 
derivatives 14.3 9.4 –69.1 78.5 9.1 6.8 –54.7 61.6 
Other investment 250.0 7.2 2.7 4.5 110.2 11.3 13.3 –2.0 
Reserve assets N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 201.2 –61.0 –56.4 –4.6 
External assets/ 
liabilities in debt 
instruments3 
380.5 –2.7 7.5 –10.2 348.2 –72.4 –56.4 –16.0 
Short-term 151.1 –9.2 N.A. N.A. 279.6 –53.5 N.A. N.A. 
Long-term 229.4 6.5 N.A. N.A. 68.6 –18.9 N.A. N.A. 
1  Changes in assets/liabilities by way of economic trades involving financial instruments.    2  Changes in 
assets/liabilities through price changes, exchange rate changes and other changes in volume.    3  Direct 
investment (equity capital), equity securities and financial derivatives are excluded from the total amount of 
Korean investment abroad.    p = preliminary. 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
As of the end of 2008, the outstanding amount of foreign investment in Korea stood at 
USD 601.3 billion, a decrease of USD 225.0 billion from the end of 2007 (USD 826.3 billion). 
The sharp decrease in foreign investment in Korea was mainly attributable to a decrease in 
portfolio investment (–USD 204.9 billion) due to the weakening of the won against the 
US dollar and a fall in Korean stock prices, which brought about a decrease in the appraised 
value of stocks. 
On the other hand, as of the end of 2008, the outstanding amount of Korea’s external 
investment stood at USD 491.5 billion, a decrease of USD 105.3 billion from the end of 2007. 
In the decrease in portfolio investment (–USD 83.2 billion), losses of USD 60.1 billion 
reflected non-transaction factors attributable to the decline in international stock markets.  
Reducing the need for large foreign exchange reserves  
In a time of global financial unrest, developing countries are facing increasing financial 
difficulties, mainly due to their so-called “original sin”, which prevents them from borrowing 
externally in national currency. The financial crisis in advanced markets has affected banking 
in emerging markets through three channels. The first is the reduction in net capital flows 
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from foreign investors to emerging markets. When financial crises erupt, in their rush to 
address balance sheet imbalances and reprice risk, foreign investors withdraw funds from 
emerging markets. The second channel is the dislocation in wholesale interbank markets. 
Since mid-2007, the issuance of bonds and syndicated loans by emerging market banks, 
including Korean banks, has fallen sharply. The third channel is the balance sheet effect 
caused by sharp currency depreciation. Emerging market banks may face (latent) losses 
from market risk exposures. 
In the empirically prevalent scenarios of “double drain”, there is a strong linkage between an 
external drain (flight to foreign currency) and an internal drain (runs from bank deposits to 
currency) and causation may run in either direction; a banking crisis in one country can give 
rise to a currency crisis (and/or banking crisis) in another (Miller (1998)).  
If a currency is not internationalised, a combination of internal and external drains can place 
extraordinary demands on a central bank’s funds. Sometimes, the central bank needs to act 
as a lender of last resort in the foreign currency to ease the imbalance between demand and 
supply in the foreign exchange market.  
Central banks in developing countries cannot be the lenders of last resort for foreign 
currency as they have no power to print it. They can play only a limited role as the quasi-
lenders of last resort in foreign currency if they have large foreign reserve holdings. However, 
even if they do hold massive foreign reserves, they could only use a limited amount of those 
reserves in the event of a crisis, due to their fear of losing those international reserves 
(Aizenman (2008)). 
For emerging market countries which have not carried out currency internationalisation 
despite a heavy reliance on the global economy, holding a large amount of foreign exchange 
reserves is necessary as a safety net against external shocks.5  Korea’s current international 
reserves stand at USD 258 billion (May 2008) – the sixth largest reserves in the world after 
China, Japan, Russia, India and Taiwan. 
Graph 4 
Holdings of foreign reserves1 
Outstanding amount                               Outstanding amount/GDP 
 
1  As of the end of November 2008; for Korea, as of the end of January 2009.  
                                                
5  Rodrik (2006) pointed out that there is a social cost of self-insurance: the spread between private foreign 
borrowing costs and low yields on reserve assets. He insisted that the income loss to developing countries of 
accumulating foreign reserves amounts to close to 1% of GDP. According to the authors’ calculation, the 
social cost of holding foreign reserves in Korea climbed to around 1.5% of GDP during the third quarter of 
2008.  
Taiwan 
Taiwan
USD billions %
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Table 8 
Ratio of foreign exchange reserves to GDP 
In 2007, in per cent 
 Countries in the process of currency internationalisation 
Countries with currency 
internationalisation 
Korea Australia Canada New Zealand 
Switz-
erland Average Japan UK 
Euro 
area Average 
27.0 2.7 2.9 13.2 22.0 10.2 21.8 1.8 1.8 8.4 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
However, the ratios of foreign exchange reserves to GDP of countries with currency 
internationalisation or those that are in the process of internationalising their currency are 
relatively low when compared with those of emerging market countries, such as Korea. 
3.2 The costs of having an international currency 
Restrictions on the pursuit of domestic monetary policy 
Once a country internationalises its currency and attracts an increasing flow of foreign 
investment and holdings, its ability to conduct an independent monetary policy will be 
severely restricted. According to Aizenman et al (2008), exchange rates among advanced 
countries have been relatively stable since 2000, thanks to the introduction of the euro, but 
many countries have gradually lost their monetary policy independence.6  However, in Korea, 
under the freely flexible exchange rate system that has been in place since 1998, exchange 
rate stability has worsened as the index has declined, while its monetary independence has 
not been significantly affected. 
                                                
6  The extent of monetary independence is measured as the reciprocal of the annual correlation of monthly 
interest rates between the home country and the base country. Higher values of the index mean greater 
monetary policy independence. 
, where i refers to the home country and j to the base country. 
To measure exchange rate stability, annual standard deviations of the monthly exchange rate between the 
home country and the base country are calculated and included in the following formula to normalise the index 
between zero and one. Higher values of this index indicate more stable movement of the exchange rate 
against the currency of the base country. 
  
For the measure of financial openness, we use the index of capital account openness designed by Chinn and 
Ito (2006, 2008). Higher values of this index indicate that a country is more open to cross-border capital 
transactions. 
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Graph 5 
Changes in Korea’s trilemma indices 
 
Source: Aizenman et al (2008). 
 
However, when we apply a different method from Aizenman et al (2008), who measured 
monetary policy independence using correlations between US interest rates and domestic 
interest rates, Korea’s monetary independence seems to be highly affected by volatility in 
foreign transactions. 
In Korea, Monetary Stabilisation Bonds (MSBs) were issued in order to absorb the expanded 
liquidity generated by the huge reserves. As a result, the asset and debt structure of the 
Bank of Korea is concentrated on foreign assets and MSBs. In consequence, the BoK’s 
balance sheet has been vulnerable to domestic and foreign interest rate differences and 
exchange rate fluctuations. During 2004–07, when the won/dollar exchange rate was in a 
state of constant decline, the balance sheet position of the BoK shifted into deficit. 
A central bank’s balance sheet imbalances or prolonged deficit can place potential restraints 
on monetary policy. That is because severe deficits on the central bank’s account may act as 
a constraint on raising the base rate even when a price rise is expected, resulting in a loss of 
confidence in monetary policy. Furthermore, the extra liquidity created by the large amount of 
interest payments on its obligations – MSBs in the case of Korea – would add inflationary 
pressure. As an alternative, in order to reduce the accumulation of MSBs, the disposal of 
foreign assets may be necessary, but this is not an easy option because the accumulation of 
reserves is precautionary in nature. 
Worsening the capital inflows problem  
In order to pursue currency internationalisation, foreign exchange and capital liberalisation 
must first be undertaken. However, in the process of capital account liberalisation and 
currency internationalisation, there may be some side effects, including the so-called “capital 
inflows problem”. In emerging market countries, excessive capital inflows induced by a high 
expected rate of return generate an overvaluation of the exchange rate relative to the real 
economy, stock market bubbles and a sharp drop in interest rates. On the other hand, in 
times of deteriorating economic conditions, excessive capital outflows may lead to a dramatic 
rise in exchange rates, a stock market plunge and a sharp rise in interest rates. Due to a high 
level of integration with international financial markets, emerging market countries may face 
sudden deleveraging on the part of foreign capital even when they have stable 
macroeconomic fundamentals.  
 
Exchange rate stability 
Monetary independence 
Financial openness 
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Table 9 
Lagged correlations between capital flows and GDP growth 
 –2 –1 0 1 2 
Capital inflows –0.04 0.24 0.47 0.10 0.10 
 FDI 0.03 –0.04 –0.06 –0.05 –0.10 
 Stocks 0.12 0.26 0.14 0.07 0.04 
 Bonds –0.17 0.24 0.42 0.08 0.09 
 Other 0.06 –0.12 0.33 0.08 0.08 
 
Graph 6 
Korea’s capital account and GDP growth rate 
 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
In Korea, international capital flows show a procyclical pattern – they get bigger in the 
expansion phase and smaller in the contraction period – which raises the potential risk of 
wild economic fluctuations. For example, capital flows to and from Korea are directly related 
to its GDP growth rate (adjusted for seasonal changes; compared with the same period of 
the previous year); borrowed funds from financial institutions, in particular, have a significant 
effect on economic fluctuations. 
Furthermore, the fallout from the recent global financial crisis has affected Korea’s financial 
markets and real economy. Owing to the evaporation of global liquidity, starting from 
September 2008, foreign currency borrowing conditions for Korean banks have severely 
worsened. The spreads and credit default swap (CDS) (five-year) premia on Foreign 
Exchange Stabilisation Fund (FESF) bonds (2013 maturity) have shown marked upward 
trends. Domestic credit spreads have also widened rapidly on corporate and bank bonds. 
This phenomenon is due to the heightened aversion to credit risk in line with the global 
financial market turmoil, the expanded supply of banks’ financial debentures, and bond sell-
offs by liquidity-strapped securities firms.  
Capital account/GDP (lhs) Growth rate (rhs)
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Graph 7 
Credit spread trends 
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Sources: Bank of Korea; Bloomberg. 
4. Currency and financial cooperation in Asia 
Given the important benefits of currency internationalisation in emerging market economies 
as discussed above, it will be critical for Korea to steadily pursue internationalisation of the 
won once global financial markets regain stability.  
However, the recent crisis has demonstrated that financial globalisation can cause “collateral 
damage” to emerging market economies: countries which are open to international financial 
capital tend to have greater vulnerability to a sudden reversal of capital inflows. Considering 
this risk and the fact that no individual country’s reserve accumulation is sufficient to meet 
precautionary objectives, strengthening regional financial cooperation and building up a 
regional safety net should be considered top priorities.  
Economic rationale for regional currency cooperation in East Asia 
Over the last few decades, the East Asian region has developed as a new growth pole for 
the world economy. However, the prolonged turmoil in the global financial market has 
eventually worked to weaken Asian economies through various channels. Despite their 
relatively healthy fundamentals, those economies are suffering severe liquidity constraints in 
foreign currency. Consumption and investment have weakened through shrinking liquidity, 
rising capital costs and a decline in household wealth. A contraction in the import demand of 
advanced countries has led to a pronounced decline in Asian export growth.  
If Asian economies cannot sustain their growth and do not contribute to world economic 
recovery, the possibility of a more prolonged global recession cannot be ruled out. In order to 
prevent deep downturns of the global economy, it is necessary to have a regional safety net 
to absorb the shock from the global crisis to Asian economies. Regional financial cooperation 
is essential to avoid double mismatches of maturities and currencies in this time of global 
financial unrest. 
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Table 10 
Economic interdependence among Asian countries 
Trade Long-term debt securities Equity securities 
 
East 
Asia 31 
East 
Asia 92 
East 
Asia 31 
East 
Asia 92 
East 
Asia 31 
East 
Asia 92 
Korea 31.2 51.0 5.7 17.3 16.7 50.2 
China 46.3 41.2 6.7 48.8 5.4 56.9 
Hong Kong 57.2 99.8 25.0 28.6 10.9 16.4 
Indonesia 31.5 64.9 3.4 10.3 5.6 30.6 
Malaysia 23.9 60.9 4.5 28.0 8.7 35.1 
Philippines 31.1 62.7 2.1 8.0 7.3 16.1 
Singapore 22.2 58.0 11.0 26.1 13.2 25.3 
Taiwan 18.2 82.5 2.4 7.0 4.0 39.9 
Thailand 27.7 53.3 3.6 13.7 9.5 31.4 
United States 19.2 28.3 12.3 16.6 12.3 16.6 
Japan 22.8 44.5 1.6 4.4 0.4 1.1 
European Union 5.6 8.2 9.3 14.2 4.2 4.8 
United Kingdom 6.9 11.2 8.1 13.2 3.9 5.0 
1  Share of Asia 3 (Korea, China and Japan) in each country’s total trade, long-term debt securities and equity 
securities.    2 China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand. 
Source: IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS); IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
 
The path to strengthening regional financial cooperation in Asia 
Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, regional financial cooperation has been pursued by 
governments and central banks through diverse forums and arrangements such as the 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative 
(ABMI).  
The CMI, which established mutual currency swap networks between central banks of the 
ASEAN+3, a process that began in May 2000, was set up to provide short-term loans when a 
member country encountered financial difficulties or found itself in need of short-term 
liquidity. However, the institutional settings are insufficient and the policy framework too weak 
to effectively cope with the emergence of foreign currency liquidity problems in the region. 
Despite mutual currency swap lines amounting to USD 84 billion (in a total of 17 cases under 
the CMI), as of the end of September 2008 there had been no record of any execution. 
Currently, various options are being investigated to advance the framework of this regional 
liquidity support arrangement (CMI Multilateralisation). 
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Table 11 
Mutual currency swap contracts under the CMI 
In billions of US dollars 
 Korea Japan China Thailand Malaysia Philippines Indonesia Singapore Total 
Korea 0 13 4 1 1.5 2 2 0 23.5 
Japan 8 0 3 6 1 6 6 3 33 
China 4 3 0 1.5 2 4 0 0 16.5 
 
In a further move, the ABF was launched in June 2003 to boost investments in a basket of 
Asian issuers’ US dollar-denominated bonds. In August 2003, the ABMI was agreed with the 
aim of promoting the development of domestic and regional bond markets in order to recycle 
the huge amount of accumulated regional savings and foreign reserves in Asia. Local 
currency bond markets in Asia have developed remarkably during the past decade. 
However, they are still in their infancy in both size and quality compared with those of 
advanced countries, and could not effectively promote the circulation of Asian investments 
within the region (Hyun and Chang (2008)).  
To mitigate the malign shock of the global financial turmoil, international swap facilities with 
major central banks have recently been established. In Korea, following on from the 
establishment of a reciprocal currency swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve (up to 
USD 30 billion) on 30 October 2008, a swap facility between the BoK and the People’s Bank 
of China for an amount up to CNY 180 billion / KRW 38 trillion was announced on 
12 December 2008. On the same day, the maximum amount of the existing bilateral won/yen 
swap arrangement with the Bank of Japan was increased from USD 3 billion to 
USD 20 billion.  
For the won/renminbi or won/yen swaps to be effective, the currencies should be used as 
invoice currencies, at least in the Asia region. Needless to say, increased use of the local 
currencies for trade settlement among Korea, China and Japan will reduce transaction costs 
by cutting out foreign exchange conversion charges and will increase the stability of bilateral 
exchange rates. However, the currency of trade settlements is determined privately between 
buyers and sellers, which makes it difficult for policymakers to intervene in the trade market. 
For instance, the won/yen market was created in 1996 but closed just four months later due 
to liquidity shortages – Korea considered creating it again in early 2007, but it failed to catch 
on because of low trading volumes and had little impact in terms of reducing transaction 
costs.  
In order to expand local currency transactions in the Asia region, especially transactions 
between the won, renminbi and yen, residual regulation of foreign exchange transactions 
should be eased to a similar level. The deregulation of foreign capital transactions may 
facilitate the adoption of local currencies in line with the large scale of the external 
transactions of each country. 
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Table 12 
Comparison of foreign exchange liberalisation in Japan, Korea and China 
Transaction denominated 
in local currency 
Settlement in 
local currency 
Holding of local currency 
by non-residents 
 Current 
account 
transactions 
Capital 
account 
transactions 
Current 
account 
transactions 
Capital 
account 
transactions 
Deposits Borrowings 
Japan No restrictions 
No 
restrictions 
No 
restrictions 
No 
restrictions 
No 
restrictions 
Partially 
restricted 
Korea No restrictions 
Reporting 
required 
No 
restrictions 
Partially 
allowed 
No 
restrictions 
Reporting 
required if 
KRW 30 billion 
exceeded 
China 
Allowed for 
Hong Kong 
residents 
Restricted Allowed up toCNY 20,000 Restricted 
Allowed for 
Hong Kong 
residents 
Restricted 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has evaluated the standing of the Korean won as an international currency. 
Although Korea’s share in international output, trade and finance has increased remarkably, 
the international use of the Korean won has so far been insignificant, even in the Asia region.  
The potential benefits and costs of currency internationalisation have been discussed with 
reference to some recent episodes in the development of the Korean economy. Under the 
influence of the global financial crisis, a number of emerging economies that suffer from a 
shortage of dollar liquidity have been severely affected, and Korea is among them. Attaining 
Internationalisation of a currency may be considered as an ultimate step in order to prevent 
the adverse effects of foreign exchange shortage in small open economies such as Korea. 
However, pursuing internationalisation of the local currency could further damage the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, which is already being experienced due to the large scale 
of capital flows. Moreover, in its early stages, internationalisation of the won may hinder 
rather than help the stabilisation of the domestic capital market.  
Thus, it is important for Korea to find a possible strategy for pursuing won internationalisation 
while maintaining a safety net. One possible way is to strengthen regional financial 
cooperation involving the Korean won. Other measures are also necessary, such as 
strengthening prudential regulations and minimising regulatory arbitrage across countries. 
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Appendix: 
The relationship between foreign and domestic liquidity 
In order to investigate the relationship between foreign and domestic liquidity, we applied a 
VAR analysis for the period from the first quarter of 2000 to the last quarter of 2008, using 
spread data from the BoK and CDS data from Bloomberg. Parameters are arranged in order, 
starting with spreads on Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund (FESF) bonds, the stock price 
index, and spreads on domestic corporate bonds. Almost all parameters turned out to have 
unit roots, hence we took log differences in them. We specify the optimal lag length as 1, 
according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz criterion (SC). 
The impulse responses of each parameter – spreads on FESF bonds (SPREAD FESF), 
spreads on domestic corporate bonds (SPREAD BBB), and the stock price index (KOSPI) – 
are exhibited on the next page.  
The results of the VAR analysis correspond to what we expected: first, the impulse response 
of spreads on foreign currency borrowings (SPREAD1) moved in a positive direction for 
SPBBB, a negative direction for KOSPI, and then completely disappeared around the 10th 
quarter. In a similar manner, spreads on bonds (SPREAD BBB) had a positive response in 
reaction to spreads on foreign currency borrowings (SPREAD1) while having a negative 
impact on KOSPI during the 15-quarter period. However, the stock price index (KOSPI) 
showed a negative shock impact on both spreads on foreign currency borrowings 
(SPREAD1) and spreads on bonds (SPREAD BBB).  
This phenomenon can be explained by the so-called “financial accelerator” theory. A weak 
link to international financial markets, in the sense of insufficient amount or value of assets 
that can be accepted as collateral by foreigners, can limit the smoothing of external shocks.7 
In particular, if a certain external shock, such as the current international financial turmoil 
generated by the subprime crisis, makes foreigners start withdrawing their investments/loans 
from an emerging economy, the value of the assets in the emerging economy decreases, 
which results in a lowering of the value of collateral, inducing further sell-offs of the emerging 
economy’s assets held by foreigners. Concurrently, this feedback causes exchange rate 
depreciation and deteriorates the balance sheets of the emerging economy’s domestic 
agents through the decline in asset prices and the ballooning of domestic currency 
denominated foreign debts. The deterioration of domestic agents’ balance sheets now shifts 
over into the standard “financial accelerator” channels, causing a further shrivelling-up of 
domestic credit. 
                                                
7  See Caballero (2000). 
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Results of impulse response 
(SPREAD FESF) (SPREAD BBB) (KOSPI) 
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